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ABSENT ACCOUNTABILITY:
HOW PROSECUTORIAL IMPUNITY
HINDERS THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE IN AMERICA
Scott J. Krischke*
“The primary responsibility of prosecution is to see that
justice is accomplished.”
– National District Attorney’s Association1
INTRODUCTION
In the late afternoon of January 13, 2009, eighteen-year-old
Rondell Rogers was marched from his jail cell at Orleans Parish
Prison to Magistrate Court in New Orleans Criminal District
Court.2 Wearing an orange jumpsuit and the chains required of the
inmates of Orleans Parish Prison, Rogers took hobbled, jangling
steps over to the defense table to begin a probable cause hearing.
Rogers, a local kid from the tough Mid-City neighborhood of New

* Scott J. Krischke, BA DePaul University, JD Candidate Brooklyn Law School
(expected 2011); Law Clerk for Orleans Public Defenders (2009), Cook County
Public Defender’s Office (2010), and Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn (2010–
2011); Defense Investigator, Dinolt Becnel & Wells Investigative Group,
Washington, DC (2007–2011). Special thanks to my Mom and Dad, Jason
Krischke, Phil Becnel, Stuart Weg, Jon Sabin, Shayna Kessler, the staff of the
Journal of Law and Policy, all the brave and tireless public defenders
nationwide, and to the prosecutors who know that justice does not always mean
a conviction. This article is dedicated to the wrongfully prosecuted and
convicted men and women in America.
1
NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS §1.1 ( 2d ed. 1991).
2
Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, Assistant Pub. Defender, Orleans
Pub. Defenders (Nov. 5, 2009); State v. Rogers, No. M-496735, 1–2 (Orleans
Parish Crim. Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 17, 2008) (transcript on file with author).
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Orleans, had been working towards a GED3 until December 16,
2008, when he was picked up by the New Orleans Police
Department on suspicion of armed robbery and aggravated
battery.4 By the time of the hearing, Rogers had been incarcerated
for twenty-eight days and still had not been formally charged by
the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office.5
Rogers’s arrest arose out of an armed robbery that occurred in
Mid-City in the late hours of November 28, 2008.6 A little after 11
p.m. on that night, a twenty-year-old man was approaching his car
parked on the street when a black male suddenly approached him,
pointed a handgun at him, and demanded money before striking
the man in the head with the gun.7 The man gave the assailant his
money and the assailant fled.8 The victim ultimately reported the
crime to police, claiming that he recognized the assailant as a kid
from the neighborhood.9 Shortly thereafter, New Orleans police
put together a “six pack” photo lineup of young black males from
the neighborhood who had been recently arrested, including
Rondell Rogers, and showed it to the victim.10 The victim
positively identified Rogers, and police secured an arrest warrant.11
Within days, Rogers was arrested and brought to Orleans Parish
Prison.12
3

Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, supra note 2.
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing at 4, 35, State v. Rogers, No. M496735 (Orleans Parish Crim. Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 17, 2008) (transcript on file
with author).
5
After probable cause is established at arraignment and bond is set, the
State of Louisiana does not require prosecutors to file charges against the
accused for forty-five days in misdemeanor cases and sixty days in felonies. LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 701 (West 2007). Typically, indigent defendants
cannot afford bond and will wait the full forty-five to sixty days incarcerated
before prosecutors file charges before they are granted access to substantive
court proceedings. Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, supra note 2.
6
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, supra note 4, at 9.
7
Id. at 4, 9.
8
Id. at 4.
9
Id. at 4–5.
10
Id. at 5.
11
Id.
12
See Criminal District Court Docket Master Search, ORLEANS PARISH
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, http://www.opcso.org/index.php?option=com_wrapper&
4
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Rogers had been falsely implicated by the victim in this case.13
But unlike many defendants who have been misidentified, Rogers
actually had evidence to prove his innocence.14 At the time of the
robbery, Rogers had been on supervised release—house arrest via
electronic monitoring—while he awaited the outcome of an earlier
charge against him in Orleans Parish.15 While that charge would
ultimately be dismissed,16 the GPS-monitoring records from his
ankle bracelet recording his location during the time of the robbery
were preserved.17 Stuart Weg, an Orleans Public Defenders
attorney representing Rogers, had secured those records along with
the testimony of Rogers’s case manager, who monitored his ankle
bracelet, and presented them in court on January 13, 2009.18 The
case manager’s testimony detailed that at the time of the robbery,
Rogers was in his home nearly a mile away from where the
incident took place.19 The prosecuting attorney was given a copy
of these records during the proceeding.20
Yet, as Rogers presented this evidence to the magistrate judge,
the assistant district attorney for Orleans Parish objected three
times to testimony of Rogers’s case manager regarding the ankle
bracelet records, including to its record of his whereabouts on
11:20 p.m. on November 28, 2008.21 The thrust of these arguments
was that the records were unreliable and unsuitable for court use.22
These objections came notwithstanding the fact that the district
attorney’s office and law enforcement routinely use the ankle
view=wrapper&Itemid=183 (search “Last Name” for “Rogers” and search “First
Name” for “Rondell”; then follow “748800” hyperlink; then follow “496735 /
M3” hyperlink) (showing initiation of proceedings) (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
13
See id. (search “Last Name” for “Rogers” and search “First Name” for
“Rondell”; then follow “748800” hyperlink; then follow “483927 / K”
hyperlink) (showing prosecution ultimately withdrew case on June 30, 2009).
14
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, supra note 4, at 25, 28; see also
Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, supra note 2.
15
Id.
16
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, supra note 4.
17
Id. at 25.
18
Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, supra note 2.
19
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, supra note 4, at 24–36.
20
Id. at 30.
21
Id. at 29–32.
22
Id. at 35–37.
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bracelet monitoring records in court as reliable evidence to revoke
bonds and probation of other defendants found in violation of
supervised release or other reasons.23 At the conclusion of the
hearing, the magistrate judge found probable cause based on the
eyewitness identification24 and sent Rogers back to Orleans Parish
Prison to await trial.25
Within weeks, and despite having the records clearly placing
Rogers almost a mile away from the scene of the crime, the
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office filed armed robbery
charges against Rogers.26 Over the course of the next five months,
Rogers would appear in court six more times, all of which included
references to the ankle monitoring records and pleas for the
prosecutors to drop the charges.27 Despite having these records and
no physical evidence linking Rogers to the crime, prosecutors
refused.28 Rogers appeared for trial on June 30, 2009.29 Minutes
23

See Gwen Filosa, Judge Jails Kashie Fernandez on Half-Million Dollar
Bond, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 13, 2009, http://www.nola.com/
news/index.ssf/2009/05/judge_jails_kashie_fernandez_o.html (describing how
prosecutors used Fernandez’s ankle bracelet monitoring records to revoke her
bond); Laura Maggi, 1 Juvenile Caught, 2 Sought After Escape, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.nola.com/timespic/stories/index.
ssf?/base/news-7/1191392627129840.xml&coll=1 (reporting juvenile fugitive
caught after New Orleans police used his ankle bracelet monitoring to narrow
his location down to within 100 feet).
24
Eyewitness identification of the accused has long been regarded as
highly unreliable and has played a role in more than 75 percent of convictions
later overturned by DNA testing. See Eyewitness Misidentification, THE
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Sept. 22, 2010).
25
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, supra note 4, at 64; see also Criminal
District Court Docket Master records, supra note 12 (showing no bond was
posted).
26
See Criminal District Court Docket Master Search, supra note 12 (search
“Last Name” for “Rogers” and search “First Name” for “Rondell”; then follow
“748800” hyperlink; then follow “496735 / M3” hyperlink).
27
Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, supra note 2; see also Criminal
District Court Docket Master records, supra note 12.
28
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, supra note 4, at 30; see also Criminal
District Court Docket Master records, supra note 12 (showing prosecutors asked
for and received several continuances in the case after dating to December
2008).
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before it was to begin, they dismissed the charges against him.30
He would be released in the early morning hours of the next day
after spending more than six months in prison.31 His efforts
towards achieving his GED would need to start from square one,
but he would finally be able to sleep in his own bed that night.
While some may find it easy to call the prosecution’s handling
of Rogers’s case shameful, there is a more difficult question: How
might prosecutors be held accountable for keeping him imprisoned
for more than six months despite having clear evidence that he
could not have committed this crime? The Orleans Parish District
Attorney’s office does not have an independent body tasked with
investigating alleged prosecutorial abuses; as such, there is no
source with authority over the prosecution to which Rogers could
complain.32 There are no criminal statutes in Louisiana under
which prosecutors may be prosecuted for this type of abuse.33
Rogers could bring a federal civil rights action against the District
Attorney’s office for violation of his due process rights34 but given
that a magistrate judge had found probable cause based on the
witness identification in the earlier photo lineup,35 and established
federal law grants absolute immunity from civil suits brought
against prosecutors, he would be unlikely to prevail.36
29

Id.
Id.
31
Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, supra note 2.
32
See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. (West 2010) (showing no statutes
authorizing independent body to oversee prosecutors).
33
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. title 14 (West 2007).
34
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2006) (allowing for civil cause of action
against those who use a position of governmental authority to deprive someone
of his or her constitutional rights or privileges).
35
See supra text accompanying note 24.
36
Since 1976, prosecutors have functioned under the absolute immunity
doctrine, which shields them from liability for civil actions brought by those
charged or convicted as a result of “dishonest action” by prosecutors, including
maliciously filing charges without probable cause. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409 (1976). The Supreme Court refused to allow such suits as “it would prevent
the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential
to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system.” Id. at 427–28; see also
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124 (1997) (stating that a prosecutor is not
open to suit if acting within the realm of her duties); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
30
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What happened in the case of Rondell Rogers was borne out of
the wide discretion that prosecuting attorneys enjoy throughout the
United States. Rondell Rogers is not alone. Abuse of prosecutorial
discretion is just one way that defendants have found themselves
denied justice. Recent revelations that prosecutors illegally
withheld exculpatory evidence concerning defendants37 have led to
hundreds of overturned convictions.38 Widespread complaints of
police corruption and overreaching have led to the discovery of
prosecutors tacitly approving and even encouraging perjured incourt testimony by police to violate suspects’ constitutional
rights.39 But despite these well-documented faults in the criminal
justice system, prosecutors’ offices across the country have failed
to substantively adapt to the realities of criminal law
enforcement.40
Part I of this Note will address the many ways in which
criminal defendants are denied justice at the hands of prosecutors
while Part II will document the consequences of a prosecutorial
system without accountability. These consequences include
undermined public trust and legitimacy of law enforcement,41
wasted taxpayer money,42 and the theft of liberty from the

266, 268 (1994) (stating that incarceration without probable cause is not grounds
for a violation of substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
37
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (establishing a
constitutional due process right that evidence tending to exculpate the defendant
must be provided to the defense).
38
See discussion infra Parts I.A–B; see also Ken Armstrong & Maurice
Possley, Trial & Error: Part 1: The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11,
1999, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-020103trial
1,0,479347.story [hereinafter Trial & Error: Part 1].
39
See discussion infra Part I.C; see also CITY OF N.Y., COMM’N TO
INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTICORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, COMMISSION REPORT, 36–43
(1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN REPORT].
40
See infra Part I.
41
See infra Part II.A.
42
This money includes the millions spent retrying overturned convictions,
defending themselves against lawsuits (and paying those who are successful),
and imprisoning the wrongfully convicted. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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hundreds of innocent people wrongfully imprisoned.43 Part III will
propose potential solutions to address these concerns. These
solutions involve improving the system for filing complaints
against prosecutors, establishing independent bodies to investigate
complaints, allowing complaints to be used as subjects for
disciplinary review of prosecutors, and even the imposition of
criminal charges in the most egregious of cases. A structured
system of prosecutorial accountability that addresses these
common injustices and a redefinition of the function and culture of
prosecution must be undertaken to reform criminal prosecution and
ensure a more efficient, effective, and honest criminal justice
system. Only when we stop placing prosecutors above the law can
we begin to see a wholesale reform and a greater credibility to the
operation of our criminal justice system.
I. COMMON INJUSTICES
A. Abuse of Discretion
Prosecutorial discretion is essential to the function of the
prosecutor. This discretion includes deciding when to charge, who
to charge, what to charge, and when to dismiss.44 Prosecutors are
tasked with enforcing the criminal laws passed by legislatures and
must often make hard decisions based on the facts of each
individualized case and the office’s available resources.45
Considerations such as a defendant’s prior criminal record and the
severity of individual offenses require that prosecutors retain
significant discretion and vesting the decision of whom and how to
prosecute in an authority outside of a prosecutors’ office is simply
unworkable.46 The vast implications of this discretion, however,
43
44

See infra Parts I.A–B.
Teah R. Lupton, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279, 1280–82

(2002).
45

See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 13–14 (2007).
46
The Supreme Court has stated that “[e]xamining the basis of a
prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement
by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry,
and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government’s
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make it rife for abuse. Due to the broad nature of prosecutorial
discretion, abuses of discretion are impossible to quantify. Abuse
of discretion arguably occurred in the case of Rondell Rogers,
where prosecutors ignored and even fought to suppress material
evidence proving his innocence.47 Other reported instances of
abuse of discretion include threatening witnesses with trumped up
or false criminal charges unless they testify in the prosecutor’s
favor,48 offering jailhouse informants with near zero credibility
reduced sentences in exchange for favorable testimony against
another defendant,49 and levying knowingly false allegations
against defendants and witnesses during opening and closing
statements at trial.50 All of these practices not only violate common
sense standards of decency, but also the American Bar
Association’s standards of professional conduct, the content of
which all attorneys are required to swear an oath to uphold.51
Rogers’s ordeal pales in comparison to the abuse of discretion
involved in the case of Rolando Cruz, who in 1985 was sentenced
to death in DuPage County, Illinois for the brutal rape and murder
of ten-year-old Jeanine Nicarico.52 Cruz, then nineteen, became a
person of interest in the case after he attempted to cash in on a
$10,000 reward by providing fabricated information to police
investigating the case.53 Despite having no physical evidence
enforcement policy.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
47
See supra notes 1–31 and accompanying text.
48
DAVIS, supra note 45, at 123–24.
49
Radley Balko, Absolute Immunity on Trial, REASON MAGAZINE, Nov. 9,
2009, http://reason.com/archives/2009/11/09/absolute-immunity-on-trial.
50
Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: Part 2: The Flip Side
of a Fair Trial, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/watchdog/chi-020103trial2,0,754391.story [hereinafter Trial & Error:
Part 2].
51
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2002).
52
Cruz was also convicted with another man, Alejandro Hernandez.
Rolando Cruz & Alejandro Hernandez, THE JUSTICE PROJECT, http://www.the
justiceproject.org/profiles/rolando-cruz-and-alejandro-hernandez/ (last visited
Sept. 17, 2010). Jeanine Nicarico was abducted from her suburban Chicago
home on February 25, 1983. Her body was found two days later less than two
miles from her home. Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, ATLANTIC ONLINE, Nov.
1999, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/99nov/9911wrongman.htm.
53
Berlow, supra note 52.
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implicating Cruz, an entire case built around the testimony of
jailhouse snitches, and a written confession to the Nicarico killing
from Brian Dugan, a previously-confessed child rapist and
murderer already incarcerated in neighboring LaSalle County,
prosecutors charged Cruz and his co-defendant, Alejandro
Hernandez.54 Prosecutors in the Cruz case withheld Dugan’s
confession from defense attorneys and continued to prosecute
Cruz, even when his convictions were overturned after Dugan’s
confession was finally revealed.55 In their case against Cruz,
prosecutors put police on the stand who told the jury that Cruz had
made gravely incriminating statements—yet they had no
recordings of any of these alleged statements.56 Cruz’s conviction
would be overturned twice over the course of the next decade, and
each time prosecutors reinstituted charges, including in 1995 after
receiving modern DNA test results showing Cruz’s DNA was not
found on Jeanine.57 In November 1995 the charges against Cruz
and Hernandez were finally dismissed,58 and Cruz was freed after
spending more than ten years on death row.59 In 1999, three of the
prosecutors who had continued to charge Cruz and four law
enforcement officers who claimed in court that he made the
unrecorded incriminating statements were placed on trial for
conspiracy to frame Cruz by using false evidence.60 All of them

54

Id.
Cruz & Hernandez, supra note 52.
56
Know the Cases: Rolando Cruz, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/Content/77.php (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). A police
detective, a sheriff’s lieutenant, a state’s attorney, and an assistant attorney
general all resigned their positions out of protest for the continued prosecution
of Cruz. Berlow, supra note 52. The police detective would ultimately testify for
the defense and the sheriff’s lieutenant recanted his testimony as fabrications
from Cruz’s first trial. See People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 645–648 (Ill. 1994);
Cruz & Hernandez, supra note 52.
57
Know the Cases: Rolando Cruz, supra note 56.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: Part 3: Prosecution
on Trial in DuPage, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1999, http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/watchdog/chi-020103trial3,0,610421.story [hereinafter Trial & Error:
Part 3]. Other counts included perjury and obstruction of justice. Id.
55
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were acquitted.61
B. Brady Violations
Prosecutors’ duty to disclose evidence tending to exculpate the
accused is an oft-cited subject of prosecutorial misconduct.62 On
July 24, 1976, in Auburn, New York, George Sedor was sitting in
his car in the parking lot of the restaurant that he owned when two
unknown gunmen opened fire on him.63 He was shot six times and
killed.64 His brother, who witnessed the shooting, told police that
he saw two white men running from the scene.65 Prosecutors kept
that statement hidden from defense attorneys along with other
statements taken from witnesses when they arrested Sammy
Thomas and Willie Gene, both black, and charged them with
Sedor’s murder.66 Prosecutors secured convictions based on the
testimony of Steven Wejko, a witness who police believed
supplied the guns used in Sedor’s murder; they obtained Wejko’s

61

Bob Gibson, When Justice Hides its Face, J. DUPAGE COUNTY B. ASS’N,
May 2005, at 3, http://www.dcba.org/brief/mayissue/2005/art10505.pdf. But see
Patrick A. Tuite, The DuPage Seven Case from My Perspective, J. DUPAGE
COUNTY B. ASS’N, June 2000, http://www.dcba.org/brief/junissue/2000/
art040600.htm (arguing that prosecutors acted in good faith). Brian Dugan, the
original confessed killer of Jeanine Nicarico, pleaded guilty to her rape and
murder in DuPage County in 2009. Art Barnum, Brian Dugan Admits to
Nicarico Slaying, Rape, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2009, http://www.chicagotribune.
com/news/local/brian-dugan-guilty-090729,0,5402784.story. At sentencing,
DuPage County prosecutors successfully argued for a death sentence for Dugan.
Art Barnum & Ted Gregory, Jeanine Nicarico Murder: Tears of Joy as Brian
Dugan Gets Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12, 2009, http://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/chi-dugan-death-penalty-12-nov12,0,2638852.story.
Cruz
later reached a settlement in a civil suit against the DuPage County State’s
Attorney’s Office for $3.5 million. Gibson, supra at 3.
62
See Trial & Error: Part 1, supra note 38. See also Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963) (establishing a defendant’s due process right to material
information tending to prove his innocence).
63
Walter Rewald, Sedor Decision in Two Weeks, THE CITIZEN (Auburn),
Jan. 25, 1979, at 1.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
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testimony in exchange for a reduced sentence.67 Thomas and
Gene’s convictions were later overturned after the exculpatory
witness statements were discovered; the charges against Thomas
were dropped and Gene was acquitted after the defense entered the
statements during his retrial.68 The man who originally prosecuted
them, Peter Corning, went on to become a judge.69
In 1977, after an evening playing bingo, ninety-two-year-old
Emma Crapser was returning to her home in Poughkeepsie, New
York, when an unidentified assailant attacked her, severely beating
and suffocating her.70 In 1983, Dewey Bozella, eighteen-years-old
at the time of the incident and with a history of petty crime, was
convicted of Crapser’s murder.71 Prosecutors had no physical
evidence linking Bozella to the murder and relied entirely on
testimony from jailhouse informants who testified in exchange for
reduced sentences, were admittedly under the influence of drugs at
the time of the crime, and who provided inconsistent accounts.72 In
2009, private attorneys who took on Bozella’s case pro bono found
old notes from a retired police lieutenant that implicated another
man, Donald Wise, in the crime.73 Bozella’s attorneys then filed
freedom of information requests and discovered a taped police
interview of a witness who told police that he watched Donald
Wise planning a burglary near the Crapser apartment and described
how Wise may have already killed another woman.74 Police found
a fingerprint at the scene of the crime that would eventually be
positively matched to Wise, who had been subsequently convicted

67

New York State (Exclusive of New York City), VICTIMS OF THE STATE,
http://www.victimsofthestate.org/NY/indexNYS.html (last visited Sept. 17,
2010).
68
Trial & Error: Part 1, supra note 38.
69
Id.
70
Joel Stashenko, Citing Withheld Evidence, Judge Orders Third Trial in
1977 Slaying, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 2009, at 1, col. 4.
71
Peter Applebome, Unyielding in His Innocence, Now a Free Man, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/nyregion/29towns.
html.
72
Stashenko, supra note 70, at 1, col. 4.
73
Id.
74
Id.
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for a near-identical murder in the same neighborhood.75 After
Bozella was granted a retrial in October 2009 in light of this
evidence, prosecutors dropped the charges against him.76
Thomas, Gene, and Bozella were all victims of prosecutors
who failed to disclose evidence tending to exculpate the accused.
Disclosure of such evidence is a constitutional due process right of
all criminal defendants established by the Supreme Court in
1963.77 The Supreme Court established the rule to ensure that the
accused is granted a fair trial.78 It is designed to remind the
prosecutor of the responsibility to administer justice and that the
“system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused
is treated unfairly.”79 The decision embodied the earlier words of
Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland, opining that the
prosecutor, “while he may strike hard blows, is not at liberty to
strike foul ones.”80 As the cases above demonstrate, the problem of
prosecutors withholding exculpatory evidence persists.81 An
75

Applebome, supra note 71.
Id.
77
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). The Supreme Court
established three elements of a Brady violation: “[1] The evidence at issue must
be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either
willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). In order to satisfy the prejudice prong, it
must be shown that the evidence was material to the outcome. See id. at 282.
78
See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
79
Id.
80
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). The quote continues, “It
is as much [the prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated
to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.” Id.
81
For more examples of cases that have been overturned after prosecutors
withheld evidence, see Estes Thompson, N.C. Man Acquitted of Murder,
CHARLOTTE NEWS-OBSERVER, Feb. 18, 2004, http://www.truthinjustice.org/
Alan-Gell.htm (man sentenced to death for murder in 1995 acquitted after
prosecutors concealed interviews with seventeen witnesses that proved suspect
was in police custody at time of murder); Jennifer Emily, Man Released from
Jail After Judge Recommends Lifting Sexual Assault Conviction, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 18, 2008, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/
dws/news/dmn/stories/111808dnmetjohnson.1c09af252.html (two sexual assault
convictions overturned after it was revealed that prosecutors failed to turn over
76
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investigation conducted in 1999 by the Chicago Tribune found that
between 1963 and 1999, at least 381 defendants nationwide had a
homicide conviction thrown out after revelations that prosecutors
concealed exculpatory evidence and presented evidence in court
they knew to be false.82 Of those cases, sixty-seven had been
sentenced to death.83
C. Perjured Police Testimony
Michael Dowd was arrested in May 1992 by the Suffolk
County Police Department on charges that he was running a midlevel cocaine ring through Brooklyn and Suffolk County, New
York.84 The case would not be unique aside from the fact that
Dowd and his five co-defendants were all officers of the New York
Police Department.85 The highly-publicized arrests served as the
bellwether for an investigation of New York City Police
Department (“NYPD”) practices and tactics and led to the creation
of what would later be known as the Mollen Commission.86 The
findings of the near two-year investigation were released in July
1994 and documented numerous instances of police corruption, a
culture devoid of accountability, and systemic violations of
citizens’ rights by police.87 Aside from the blatant corruption in the
police interview notes with alleged victims in which they stated assault never
occurred); Richard A. Webster, Life Sentence: Justice Elusive for Wrongfully
Convicted Victims, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUSINESS, June 4, 2007, http://www.ra-e.org/press/life-sentence-justice-elusive-wrongfully-convicted-victims (man
acquitted after eighteen years in prison after former prosecutor admitted on his
deathbed that he withheld blood evidence that would exonerate him).
82
Trial & Error: Part 1, supra note 38.
83
Id.
84
See MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 39, at 91.
85
Richard Lacayo, Jordan Bonfante & Sharon Epperson, Cops and
Robbers, TIME, Oct. 11, 1993, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,979358,00.html.
86
Harold Baer, Jr. & Joseph P. Armao, The Mollen Commission Report: An
Overview, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 73, 73–74 (1995–1996).
87
See id. The investigation concluded with the firing of dozens of officers
and the institution of “integrity tests” administered at random to officers. Chris
Smith, The Police Police, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 22, 1997, http://nymag.com/news/
features/49093/.
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Dowd case and others, the commission uncovered an established
tradition of police officers concealing violations of suspects’
constitutional rights by falsifying arrest reports and later, if needed,
committing perjury when questioned in court about obtaining that
evidence.88 Police, knowledgeable of the constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure,89 as well as the fact that
any evidence arising out of a search in violation of this right is
inadmissible at trial,90 were found to consistently lie about how
evidence was obtained.91 A common illustration of this is when
police officers stop a car with no probable cause to believe that the
driver has committed any crime.92 The driver is immediately
ordered out of the car and without asking, police conduct searches
of his car and person, discovering a bag of cocaine and a gun. The
arresting officers later write up the report and subsequently testify
that they saw the man run a red light and, upon speaking with him,
the defendant permitted the officers to search the car.93
Prosecutors throughout the country have acknowledged this
problem and have expressed frustration in dealing with perjured
testimony from police.94 The dilemma for the prosecutor arises
when police officers approach that prosecutor with cases in which
88

See Baer & Armao, supra note 86, at 76–77.
See MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 39, at 38.
90
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367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
91
MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 39, at 38.
92
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“[T]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation . . . .”) (emphasis
added); see also MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 39, at 38.
93
Several legal writers have referred to this practice as “testilying.” See,
e.g., Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1341 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to
Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV 1037 (1996). Other ways police falsify reports
include “throw down” or “dropsy” cases, where the police officer claims that the
defendant threw narcotics on the ground after he approached him, effectively
waiving his Fourth Amendment rights. See People v. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d
194, 197 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1970) (stating that judges should view “dropsy”
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there had been a likely violation of the defendant’s constitutional
rights, yet there is no solid proof of the violation aside from the
defendant’s testimony.95 Ideally, prosecutors will investigate the
case further and dismiss it if it proves untrustworthy.96 But in
reality, prosecutors will often ignore these violations and place the
officer on the stand.97 At worst, they will encourage and coach
officers to change their testimony as to the facts of the arrest to
ensure the evidence is admitted.98 Almost always, and often in
spite of clear evidence that the police violated constitutional rights,
the evidence will be admitted as long as the story is not proven to
be impossible.99 While the Mollen Commission stated that it could
not quantify the instances of police perjury,100 an investigation of
Chicago’s criminal justice system included surveys of judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys, of which more than 50 percent
agreed that at least “half of the time prosecutors knew or had
reason to know” a testifying officer was lying.101 Of the
prosecutors, 89 percent stated that they believed police perjury
occurs “at least some of the time.”102
The American Bar Association strictly prohibits an attorney
from “knowingly . . . offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer knows to
95

See id. at 28.
See id. at 32.
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See Alan M. Dershowitz, Op-Ed., Controlling the Cops; Accomplices to
Perjury, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/
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prosecutors’ “muteness” on the issue).
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Cunningham, supra note 94, at 31.
99
See Carol A. Chase, Rampart: A Crying Need to Restore Police
Accountability, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 767, 772–73 (2001) (describing how
judges rarely, if ever, suppress evidence despite improbable police testimony
unless there is direct extrinsic evidence contradicting that testimony); see also
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 51 (1997) [hereinafter REASONABLE DOUBTS].
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(1992).
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be false.”103 In fact, it is a federal felony to procure or encourage
perjury.104 Still, police, prosecutors, and judges often ignore the
practice of false testimony by looking at it as a means justifying
the ends of law enforcement, seeing the fourth amendment as a
protection of the guilty and the act of lying to get around it as
merely “evening the odds” in the war on drugs.105 The difficulty
for the prosecutor in confronting this problem rests not only in
accusing his co-workers—the police—of lying, but in determining
when a lie is being told or when officers are “shading” testimony
to certain facts but not others.106 Even those prosecutors who
would stand against perjured testimony face uncooperative police
officers, indifferent investigators sent from the very police
department they are tasked with investigating, and the possibility
of implicating co-workers who have knowingly accepted perjured
testimony.107 This is not to say that prosecutors have never acted
against this problem. Former Manhattan District Attorney Robert
Morgenthau, for example, prosecuted several police officers for
perjury after they lied under oath.108 Aside from the inherent
problems with investigating and proving these claims, a prosecutor
could not be found guilty of subornation of perjury unless it can be
proven that he or she “should have known” that the police-witness
would testify falsely.109 In addition, simple strict enforcement of
these rules could potentially implicate a number of problems in
practice. Even if these charges could be proven, prosecutors are
unlikely to charge one of their own.110 Moreover, broadly pressing
charges against prosecutors in this way could have a severe
103

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002).
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1622 (West 2006) (providing that “[w]hoever
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chilling effect on prosecutors’ willingness to put police officers on
the stand, even if their testimony is true but seemingly suspect.111
This could seriously hamper legitimate law enforcement efforts.112
II. UNDERMINING LAW ENFORCEMENT
A. Public Distrust
The explosive increase in the prison population in recent years
and the racial disparity in the targets of criminal prosecutions and
incarceration have garnered an enormous amount of attention.113
Between 1980 and 2007, the prison incarceration rate of people
living in the United States increased by more than 350 percent—
nearly 11 times faster than the growth of the nation’s population.114
Among the communities most affected by law enforcement is the
black community, which, in 2009, comprised 28 percent of the
people charged with crimes in the United States, despite

111

Id.
Id.
113
See generally TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS
INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES WORSE (2009)
(discussing how incarceration of large segments of adult males from minority
communities contribute to social problems and perpetuation of criminal
offenders in families); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999)
(documenting the massive expansion of the prison population and its effect on
racial communities); JONATHAN R. SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 141
(2007) (stating that African Americans born in 2001 have a greater probability
of going to jail than they do of going to college, getting married, or joining the
military); Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The
Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202 (2007)
(demonstrating an often inadvertent difference in charging and plea bargaining
along class and racial lines and the need for conscious reform among
prosecutors).
114
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND PRISONERS IN 2008, (2008) available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/glance/tables/corr2tab.cfm; USA QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
(Aug. 16, 2010) http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html. This
increase comes despite a 32 percent decrease in the violent crime rate since
1989. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, table 1
(2009) [hereinafter CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES].
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representing just under 13 percent of the population.115 Perhaps
more representative of the vast racial divide in law enforcement is
the fact that in 2009, 40 percent of the total prison population was
black, while whites were charged with nearly 70 percent of all
crimes that same year.116 The community with the highest rate of
contact with the criminal justice system also often harbors a strong
distrust towards law enforcement.117 However, it is not the amount
of charges alone that causes this suspicion—many in the black
community have cited concerns such as unfair treatment, wrongful
arrests, and failure to solve crimes as factors in their distrust of law
enforcement.118 The importance that prosecutorial misconduct has
played in public opinion and the legitimacy of law enforcement has
not gone unnoticed. Highly-publicized stories of exonerations after
revelations of prosecutorial misconduct have led state bar
associations to criticize prosecutors who bring “the judicial system
into disrepute by their conduct.”119
Aside from the damaging instances of wrongful convictions,
prosecutors’ increased use of “snitches” in criminal prosecutions
—informants testifying for leniency in their own cases—has been
cited as a large factor in public suspicion of law enforcement,120
115

CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 114, at table 43; USA
Quickfacts, supra note 114.
116
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 114; HEATHER C. WEST, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, MID-YEAR 2009 PRISON STATISTICS (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf.
117
A survey of several polls found that 17–30 percent of the black
community has “little to no faith” in the police. Loretta J. Stalans, Codes of
Ethics, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCIENCE 188, 194 (Jack R. Greene ed.,
2007) (citing V.J. ROBERTS & L.J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2000)).
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Id. at 194–95.
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Joseph Neff, Reprimands in Gell Case, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
NC), Sept. 25, 2004, at A1, available at http://www.bluelineradio.com/
GELLPROSECUTORS.html.
120
See Alexandra Natapoff, Bait and Snitch: The High Cost of Snitching
for Law Enforcement, SLATE (Dec. 12, 2005, 5:41 PM), http://www.slate.com/
id/2132092/ [hereinafter Bait and Snitch]. Natapoff, an associate professor of
law at Loyola Law School Los Angeles, has written extensively on this subject.
See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal
Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645 (2004) [hereinafter Snitching] (arguing
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particularly because the use of snitches often results in false
information used to secure what are eventually proven to be
wrongful convictions.121 In some high-crime urban communities,
where as many as 50 percent of black males between the ages of
eighteen and thirty-five are under some kind of court supervision at
any given time,122 a large number of offenders seeking leniency
will initiate contact with prosecutors in an attempt to “turn state’s
witness” to avoid prison time.123 This use of informant testimony
can be a valid and important tool for criminal investigators and
prosecutors looking to enlist assistance in building their cases
against some of society’s most dangerous criminals, as “snitches”
may in some instances be the only witnesses to these activities.124
However, the pervasive and largely unsupervised use of snitch
testimony by prosecutors, including the use of unreliable and
inconsistent testimony, has been strongly criticized.125 Prosecutors’
use of snitches is the leading cause for wrongful capital
convictions in the United States—false testimony from snitches
played a role in nearly 46 percent of the cases of death row
exonerees between 1973 and 2004.126 Their reliance on snitches
undermines police legitimacy as law enforcement is increasingly
seen to be on the side of unrepentant criminals who would lie
about others’ involvement in crimes to receive leniency from law
enforcement and continue their own criminal activities.127 Further,
the practice of police to arrest members of the community only to
pressure them to snitch to evade facing a criminal charge has

that the use of snitches actually increases crime and often leads to the
prosecution of innocent people with whom snitches have vendettas).
121
See ROB WARDEN, NW. UNIV. CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE
SNITCH SYSTEM (Winter 2004–2005).
122
Snitching, supra note 120, at 646 n.7 (referring to high crime
communities in Baltimore, MD and Washington, DC).
123
See Bait and Snitch, supra note 120.
124
See Brian Lieberman, Ethical Issues in the Use of Confidential
Informants for Narcotics Operations, POLICE CHIEF (June 2007), http://police
chiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=12
10&issue_id=62007.
125
See Snitching, supra note 120.
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See WARDEN, supra note 121, at 3.
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resulted in a growing sentiment of community “victimization” by
police and has even fostered violence towards those accused of
being snitches, further undermining law enforcement legitimacy in
high-crime, urban communities.128
Sociologists have found that in urban neighborhoods, a rise in
negative perceptions of police legitimacy directly correlates to a
rise in violent crime.129 In order for communities to accept the law
as moral and legitimate, its members must first believe the law and
its procedures to be fair.130 As community members begin to feel
marginalized by a law enforcement system perceived as corrupt,
they will refuse to cooperate with police and reject seeking police
assistance to resolve conflicts—instead choosing to take the law
into their own hands.131 Compromised law enforcement legitimacy
will not only affect the opinions of potential criminal offenders,
but will even do so for law-abiding members of communities who
face pressure not to report crimes to a law enforcement system
viewed as uncaring and corrupt.132 A twenty-two-year study of
disadvantaged and poverty-stricken precincts in New York City
found that increases in police misconduct and over-enforcement of
non-violent crimes predicted increases in violent crime in those
neighborhoods.133 Another study conducted in Trinidad and
Tobago documented how positive perceptions of law
enforcement—stimulated by the introduction of community
policing initiatives and frequent monitoring of police honesty and
128

Id. In Baltimore, MD in 2004, a threatening underground DVD was
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fairness—led to greater collective community efficacy and an
overall consistent drop in violent crime.134 Central to these findings
was the conclusion that law enforcement officials have the power
to trigger increases in collective efficacy, corresponding with
decreases in violent crime, simply by providing fair and lawful
services to the community.135
B. Cost to Taxpayers
While prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability
in nearly all federal civil rights actions,136 seventeen states permit
lawsuits against prosecutors or allow for automatic statutory
indemnification for the wrongfully convicted.137 Still, the state and
134
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Promote Collective Efficacy and Reduce Crime and Disorder 183–87 (Spring
2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason University) (on file with
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135
See id. at 186.
136
See supra note 36 and accompanying text. See also Adam I. Kaplan,
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UCLA L. REV. 227, 233 (2008) (observing that “[s]uccessful tort suits against
the government or government officials are rare due to sovereign immunity and
various substantial burdens of proof”).
137
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19, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1924278,00.html. In
New York, tort actions against the state are permissible for the exonerated,
provided that the plaintiff can prove that “he did not commit any of the acts” for
which he was charged. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT §§ 8-b(2), 8-b(5)(c) (McKinney 2007).
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federal statutes that compensate the wrongfully convicted allow for
causes of action only against the state and federal government,
meaning that successful claims for wrongful prosecution and
conviction by exonerated defendants are paid for out of taxpayer
dollars.
There is no cumulative study documenting the total amount
taxpayers have paid to settle civil liabilities brought on by the
unjustly convicted, but the media has followed a number of these
settlements closely.138 In California, Santa Clara County has paid
out $4.6 million in settlements to the wrongfully convicted since
2005.139 Texas taxpayers have covered more than $8.8 million in
compensation to the exonerated since 2001.140 And in Illinois, the
DuPage County Board voted in 2000 to pay out $3.5 million to
settle lawsuits brought against its State’s Attorney’s Office filed by
Rolando Cruz for his wrongful capital conviction in the Jeanine
Nicarico case.141
These figures do not include the money the state must spend to
defend these civil suits.142 For example, a wrongful conviction suit
in Union County, North Carolina netted a $3.9 million settlement
in 2009 to Alan Gell, who was sentenced to death in 1995 when
prosecutors failed to turn over more than a dozen exculpatory
witness interviews and a recorded phone conversation in which the
state’s star witness spoke with a friend about framing Gell.143 In
that case, the State Bureau of Investigation spent $731,000
138
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defending itself from that suit before finally agreeing to the
settlement.144 Factor in the cost of housing the average prisoner in
the United States at $22,650 a year and the financial ramifications
of faulty convictions become apparent.145 Furthermore, this
breakdown does not include the costs of the initial felony
prosecutions, which vary widely and have not been cumulatively
quantified.146 And when the stakes are high, so are the costs.
Securing an average death penalty conviction—whether the
defendant is innocent or guilty—costs taxpayers $1.9 million more
than a non-death penalty conviction.147
C. The Human Cost
“I’m free, but I’m trapped, and no matter how much I run,
I’ll never make up for the lost time.”
– Jeff Deskovic, 34, who spent sixteen years in prison in
New York for rape and murder before a DNA
exoneration.148
The most damaging of the injuries caused by a lack of
prosecutorial accountability are those suffered by the victims of
prosecutorial misconduct. On May 9, 2003, John Thompson
stepped from the gates of the Orleans Parish Prison and into the
southern Louisiana sun.149 Clutching only a small bag of
144

Id.
See JAMES J. STEPHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES 2, 3 (2001) (reporting that operating
costs among state penitentiaries in all fifty states averaged $22,650 per inmate in
2001).
146
See Costs of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-death-penalty (last visited Sept. 23,
2010) (providing information on the costs of capital prosecutions in both the
federal and state systems).
147
See JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST., THE COST OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN MARYLAND (2008), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/CostsDP
Maryland.pdf.
148
Fernanda Santos, Vindicated by DNA, But a Lost Man on the Outside,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/us/25
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possessions and the ten dollars given to him by the Louisiana
Department of Corrections for bus fare,150 Thompson walked
slowly away from the past eighteen years he spent incarcerated at
Angola State Prison,151 the largest maximum security prison in the
United States.152 But after spending more than eighteen years
behind bars—including fourteen spent on death row—away from
his family, friends, and society, Thompson had no idea how he
would restart his life.153
Thompson was exonerated for the 1984 murder of Ray Liuzza
in New Orleans after he was granted a retrial when a New Orleans
judge learned of an assistant district attorney’s death bed
confession that he hid blood evidence that could have cleared
Thompson.154 Thompson is not alone.155 More than five hundred
people have been released from prison following exonerations for
wrongful convictions.156 On average, they spend more than twelve
years in prison before they prove their innocence.157 The
readjustment process is often jarring.158 A 2005 study found that a
few months after their release, two-thirds are not financially
independent, one-third face long legal battles to regain custody of
children taken away when they were wrongfully convicted, and
one in four suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder relating to
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their incarceration.159 Re-entry services, such as job training and
residency assistance available to parolees in the states that offer
them, are not offered to exonerees.160 Despite their innocence,
most exonerees face the same challenges as the guilty when they
are released from prison, including chronic unemployment, lack of
health care, drug addiction, homelessness, and the social stigma
associated with the formerly incarcerated.161 “Any time that
anyone has been in prison, even if you are exonerated, there is still
a stigma about you, and you are walking around with a scarlet
letter,” explained exoneree Ken Wyniemko, in an interview in The
New York Times.162 That stigma is further exacerbated by states’
traditionally slow responses in clearing the wrongful convictions
from criminal records, if they do so at all.163 Perhaps the greatest
price is in the loss of youth for the wrongfully convicted—most are
convicted in their twenties and spend an average of twelve years
behind bars164—and the difficulty of returning to a normal life after
having spent more than a decade removed from society.165
The majority of states do not offer civil remedies for the
wrongfully convicted.166 Those that do often require long legal
battles, set strict limits on how much a plaintiff can receive, and
exonerees can rarely satisfy the heavy burden of proving their
innocence and lack of involvement in any crime that is typically
required in such statutes.167 Between 1985, when New York
established a civil remedy for the wrongfully convicted, and 2001,
the success rate of these lawsuits hovered around 7 percent.168
159
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Nationwide, 40 percent of former inmates cleared through DNA
evidence did not receive any compensation for the years they spent
in prison for crimes they did not commit.169
John Thompson’s realization of these chronic and consistent
problems among the wrongfully convicted and recently freed
caused him to found the New Orleans-based Resurrection After
Exoneration.170 Resurrection After Exoneration, a non-profit
organization, provides exonerees throughout the South with
services such as job training, transitional housing, health insurance
subsidies, and support group meetings.171 And while Thompson
has found a positive outlet for his frustration over the eighteen
years he spent in prison by helping others in similar situations, the
root cause of his incarceration remains unresolved: a lack of
meaningful disciplinary action against the prosecutors who
concealed evidence of his innocence while seeking the death
penalty against him. “They call it malfeasance of office and get a
slap on the wrist while I’m up at Angola on death row for 18
years,” Thompson told New Orleans City Business newspaper in
June 2007.172 “Somebody help me understand this.”173
III. FINDING SOLUTIONS
A. Changing Prosecutorial Culture
Professionals and legal scholars of the criminal justice system
often come to one conclusion when asked why prosecutors hide
evidence and put witnesses on the stand they know to be lying—
they do it to win.174 Most people understand the role of attorneys
169

Roberts & Stanton, supra note 137.
John Thompson, Letter from the Founder, RESURRECTION AFTER
EXONERATION, http://www.r-a-e.org/about/letter-founder (last visited Sept. 29,
2010). Resurrection After Exoneration is an “offspring” of the Innocence Project
New Orleans. RESURRECTION AFTER EXONERATION, http://www.r-a-e.org/home
(last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
171
Services, RESURRECTION AFTER EXONERATION, http://www.r-a-e.org/
programs/services (last visited Sept. 24, 2010).
172
Webster, supra note 81.
173
Id.
174
See Trial & Error: Part 1, supra note 38.
170

Absent Accountability

421

as ethical and diligent advocates for their clients, whether they are
a personal injury attorney representing an injured motorist or a
contract specialist negotiating on behalf of a Fortune 500
company.175 However, this traditional understanding of the
attorney as an advocate does not fully carry over to prosecutors, at
least in theory.176 Prosecutors have officially described themselves
as advocates primarily for the administration of justice.177 The
Supreme Court adopted this definition in a 1935 review of
allegations of misconduct of an assistant United States Attorney,
stating that the prosecutor “is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy . . . and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done.”178 Unfortunately, this theory has not always been
the standard for prosecutors in reality. Legendary twentieth century
trial attorney Clarence Darrow once stated that lawyers always aim
to seek justice, however, “justice” to a prosecutor is often seen as a
guilty verdict of the defendant.179 This mindset has also taken more
extreme forms. In Illinois, prosecutors were excoriated in the
media when the public learned of their “two-ton contest”—a
running bet between prosecutors who vied to be the first in the year
to convict defendants whose compiled weight was more than 4,000
pounds.180
It is a regular practice for prosecutors’ offices to keep track of
the conviction rates of its attorneys and often provide these figures
175

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002).
See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“An inscription on the walls of the
Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain:
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courts.’”).
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See CLARENCE DARROW, VERDICTS OUT OF COURT 316 (Arthur & Lila
Weinberg eds., Elephant Paperback 1989) (1963).
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Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to
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(2009) (citing Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, The Flip Side of a Fair Trial,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, at 1).
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as evidence of success.181 However, the moment that one comes to
the realization that not all people charged with crimes are guilty,
the notion of keeping a tally of conviction rates and rewarding
those prosecutors with the highest rates becomes defunct. Keeping
score and pushing prosecutors to attain higher conviction rates
presumes that all those arrested by police are guilty and therefore
runs contrary to the cornerstone of criminal justice in democracies:
that defendants are innocent until proven guilty.182
Therefore, it is the recommendation of this author that, as an
integral first step to fundamentally overhauling the culture of
prosecutors’ offices, conviction rate-tallying should be outlawed.
Using the obtainment of a conviction as the prosecutor’s
fundamental goal encourages abuses of discretion, hiding
exculpatory evidence, and putting on false testimony, whether
these improprieties are intentional or unintentional. When
prosecutors understand and fall in line with their defined role as
ministers of justice and not advocates solely for conviction, a
collective shift in mindset can begin to take place.
Still, comprehensive reform of the culture within prosecutors’
offices must also deal with the nature of the prosecutorial culture:
181

See Carl Hessler Jr., County Prosecutors Maintained High Conviction
Rate in 2008, TIMES HERALD (Montgomery Cty., Penn.), May 10, 2009,
available
at
http://www.timesherald.com/articles/2009/05/10/news/doc4a
065381637fc800015016.txt; Donna J. Miller, Summit County Prosecutor Touts
96% Conviction Rate, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 24, 2008, 7:49 AM), http://blog.
cleveland.com/metro/2008/12/akron_summit_county_prosecutor.html;
Glenn
Nyback, Staten Island D.A. Touts Highest Felony Conviction Rate in City,
STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, June 18, 2009, available at http://www.silive.com
/news/index.ssf/2009/06/staten_island_da_touts_highest.html
(showing
an
average conviction rate among the five boroughs of New York City in 2008 of
88.8%). The United States Attorney routinely reports on the “batting average” of
its prosecutors in obtaining convictions. JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT § 1.29 (4th ed. 2009).
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administration of our criminal law.”). Democracies throughout the world have
followed this example as one of the pillars of a free and just society. Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
art. 11, §1, (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone charged with a penal offence has the
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prosecutors often seek credit and praise for high conviction rates,
try to build their own collection of “war stories,” and share these
stories to feel like a part of the team.183 While strong feelings
cannot and should not be discouraged among prosecutors when
they obtain a conviction against a factually guilty defendant whose
rights were respected, there must be an effort to distinguish those
cases from the ones where prosecutors do whatever it takes to
preserve a perfect conviction rate.184 Reform, then, should also
include enhanced inter-office visibility when prosecuting attorneys
wrongfully obtain convictions. For example, offices should share
reports of instances when prosecutorial wrongdoing was uncovered
and these reports should be included as part of required training of
prosecutors by their offices. This will help to not only prevent
similar abuses in the future but also to further endorse the
understanding that prosecutors are ministers of justice and not
simply advocates for conviction.
Even with internal reform, pressure for convictions will still
persist, as the charge for convictions is often compounded by the
strong influence of the media and a public clamoring for
convictions and the death penalty for certain suspects, even when
those people may be innocent or legally undeserving of such
punishment.185 Therefore, a second prong, involving increased
transparency of prosecutorial actions must be adopted to combat
these strong urges. In the past, supervisors have responded to a
prosecutor who refuses to press charges against someone that he or
she believes to be innocent by punishing, terminating, or simply
forcing the prosecutor to give up the case.186 Instead, those who
183

Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is
How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice
for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV 283, 292 (2001).
184
The group dynamics and loyalty that prosecutors often hold for one
another have resulted in often unanimous defense of convictions secured by
their colleagues despite abundant evidence of the defendants’ innocence. See
generally Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and
Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475 (2006).
185
See DAVIS, supra note 45, at 85–86, 171–73 (describing how public
opinion may be manipulated by political rivals to force death penalty
prosecutions and a deferential news media).
186
See Eric Zorn, Op-Ed., Burris Failed His Only Major Test in Office as
AG, CHI. TRIB., March 3, 1998 (telling the story of Illinois assistant attorney
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have refused to further prosecute cases should be given an official
channel for filing an independent review of those charges.187 When
one of these cases is not pursued—and there was clear and
convincing evidence of the defendant’s innocence—the prosecutor
who refused to prosecute should be commended within her office
and to the media. While the general public carries strong opinions
toward holding the guilty accountable, it has also demonstrated
revulsion for cases in which defendants are wrongfully
convicted.188 Speaking with the media about prosecutors who
noticed errors and refused to prosecute further will serve to bolster
the credibility and legitimacy of prosecutors and law enforcement
among society as true champions of justice, and in turn, should
reduce crime.189 A shift away from a victory-at-all-costs mentality,
combined with increased visibility of prosecutors’ faults and
positive examples of the true administration of justice will work
synergistically to shape the characteristics of prosecutors’ office to
their intended role as ministers of justice and not advocates for
conviction. This will thereby help to eliminate the recurrence of
embarrassing wrongful convictions and harmful abuses of
discretion.
B. Expanding Civil Liability
On October 6, 2010, the United States Supreme Court heard
general Mary Brigid Kenney, who was forced to resign in 1992 when she
refused to further defend the death penalty conviction of Rolando Cruz, who
was later found to be innocent). See also supra notes 52–61 and accompanying
text (discussing the Rolando Cruz case).
187
See infra Section III.C (discussing independent review board).
188
See Melanie Takarangi, Eryn Newman & Maryanne Garry, “…And
Justice for All?” Public Perceptions of Wrongful Conviction (March 4, 2009)
(unpublished study) (on file with American Psychology-Law Society)
(demonstrating a relationship towards distrust of the criminal justice system with
the seriousness of the offense for which the later proven innocent defendant was
charged and convicted); see also About Us, CENTER ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS (April 29, 2010), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongful
convictions/aboutus/ (describing success in pushes for legislation to provide for
civil remedies for the wrongfully convicted throughout the United States).
189
See supra Section II.A (concluding that positive perceptions of law
enforcement correspond with reductions in crime).

Absent Accountability

425

oral arguments in the case of Connick v. Thompson, a Fifth Circuit
decision stemming from an appeal by the New Orleans District
Attorney’s office of a $14 million judgment granted to John
Thompson, a man wrongfully convicted after prosecutors hid
exculpatory evidence.190 The case comes on the heels of a
settlement in the earlier case of Pottawattamie County v. McGhee,
where in November 2009 the Supreme Court heard oral arguments
that examined the issue of absolute prosecutorial immunity, even
in light of prosecutors who secured convictions by knowingly
fabricating evidence.191 After arguments, the case was withdrawn
due to an agreed settlement.192 If Thompson is successful, the
decision will represent the first crack in the once-thought
impenetrable shield of prosecutorial immunity from federal civil
liability for wrongful convictions,193 particularly where the
prosecutor’s office failed to properly train its assistant prosecuting
attorneys on the rules of Brady.194 In Thompson, the primary policy
concerns of the Supreme Court in establishing absolute immunity
were in preventing frivolous and time-wasting lawsuits against
prosecutors, the “chilling effect” that the threat of civil suits could
bring to the prosecutor’s execution of duty, and “the possibility
that [the prosecutor] would shade his decisions instead of
exercising the independence of judgment required by his public
trust.”195 During oral arguments in the McGhee case, Supreme
190

See Transcript of Oral Argument, Connick v. Thompson, 130 S. Ct.
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Jessica Fitts, Argument Preview: Court to Consider Liability for DA’s
Offices on Brady Violations, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 4, 2010, 8:26 AM),
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Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, herself a former Manhattan
prosecutor,196 questioned the theory that imposing civil liability on
prosecutors who present false evidence would cause too much
second-guessing of possible evidence and affect the performance
of their duty to administer justice.197 “A prosecutor is not going to
flinch when he suspects evidence is perjured or fabricated?”
Sotomayor asked. “Do you really want to send a message to police
officers that they should not merely flinch but stop if they have
reason to believe that evidence is fabricated?”198 Sotomayor hit the
nail on the head—for far too long prosecutors have enjoyed
absolute immunity, regardless of the level of their misconduct,
which has contributed to a dependence on taking actions that carry
no consequences as well as collective apathy towards defendants’
rights.
The numbers indicate that expanding civil liability has very
little impact on conviction rates and prosecutorial practice. In the
seventeen states and the District of Columbia that have passed
legislation providing civil remedies against prosecutors for those
who have been wrongfully convicted there has been little change to
the prison population.199 In fact, in 2009, district attorneys’ offices
in the five boroughs of New York City reported a 91 percent
average felony conviction rate,200 despite the fact that the state has
196

Sonia Sotomayor Biography, BOSTON GLOBE (May 27, 2009),
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/05/27/sonia_soto
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197
See Transcript of Oral Argument, Pottawattamie Cnty., supra note 191,
at 21–22.
198
Id. at 21.
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Compare supra note 137 and accompanying text (listing states with civil
liability for wrongful convictions) with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MID-YEAR 2009
PRISON STATISTICS (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf
(showing that Texas, Illinois, and New York, three of the top four largest jail
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boast_by_ag_hopeful_lacks_real_conviction.html (average determined by
calculating five boroughs’ individual conviction rate numbers).

Absent Accountability

427

allowed for wrongful conviction civil suits against prosecutors for
more than twenty-five years.201 Equally unpersuasive is the
argument that honest prosecutors will become frequent targets of
lawsuits when they prosecute and obtain lawful convictions in
good faith only to later see the defendant exonerated. The doctrine
of qualified immunity for state and federal officials, promulgated
by the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, stands to prevent
claims against such good faith prosecutions.202 Qualified, also
known as “good faith” immunity, will shield honest prosecutors
from such liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.”203
To create a more effective system of accountability among
prosecutors, it is important that individual states and the federal
government follow states that have passed legislation that provides
civil remedies for the wrongfully convicted. In the federal courts,
no longer should the wrongfully convicted rely on 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for relief,204 as Section 1983 was historically a remedial
pathway for victims of Southern racism in the late 19th century
and not unscrupulous prosecutors.205 The United States therefore
needs to pass specific legislation allowing for direct federal
remedies against prosecutors who violate constitutional rights in
securing convictions against the innocent. While it is likely that
multiple lawsuits would be filed against prosecutors in the wake of
such legislation, the 40 percent of the exonerated who have never
received any compensation for their time they spent wrongfully

201
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See Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West
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incarcerated206 would finally have the opportunity to receive
compensation for the injustices committed against them.
Consequently, the resulting media exposure of the instances of
prosecutorial misconduct that bring these cases to bear and its
ensuing cost to the taxpayers would result in a public call for more
responsible prosecutorial procedures. This would serve to reward
honest prosecutors and discipline the unethical, further facilitating
a shift of prosecutorial culture and a greater internal system of
checks for those prosecutors who might otherwise violate the law
to obtain unfounded convictions. In the cases in which a defendant
is wrongfully convicted as a result of ineffective assistance of
defense counsel, the wrongfully convicted defendant would have a
cause of action against that attorney. In faultless error cases in
which neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney is found to
be culpable for the wrongful conviction, an automatic statutory
compensation for those convicted of crimes later found to be
innocent, such as the Tim Cole Act in Texas, which provides the
wrongfully convicted with a lump sum payment of $80,000 per
year of incarceration as well as college tuition, would be
appropriate.207
C. Independent Disciplinary Review
“When there is no penalty for failure, failures
proliferate.”208
– George Will, Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist209
When investigative journalists for the Chicago Tribune began
pouring over case records of overturned convictions, the single fact
that appeared more consistently than all of the others was that the
prosecutors responsible for wrongful convictions were never
penalized for their actions.210 One example of this is the case of
206
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former St. Louis city prosecutor Nels C. Moss Jr., whose conduct
was formally challenged twenty-four times while he served as a
prosecutor there.211 Those challenges resulted in findings that he
committed reversible misconduct in seven of those cases, and was
found to have committed non-reversible “prosecutorial error” in
seventeen others.212 Moss, while scolded on record by at least one
judge for his conduct deliberately designed to “poison the minds of
the jurors regarding the defendant’s character,” was never
punished for his wrongdoing and remains a licensed attorney in
Missouri.213 In perhaps the most highly-publicized case of
prosecutorial misconduct, former Durham County District
Attorney Mike Nifong, who concealed exculpatory DNA evidence
and continued to press charges against three Duke University
students accused of rape, was ultimately fired, disbarred, and
sentenced to one day in jail after the truth surfaced of his handling
of that case.214
The prosecutor is the most powerful actor in America’s
criminal justice system.215 The decision to initiate criminal
any information that any of the prosecutors were disbarred for their actions,
despite the level of misconduct. Id. One prosecutor was fired but later appealed
the decision and was reinstated. Id. Another was suspended for fifty-nine days.
Id. In only two of the cases prosecutors were held criminally responsible, when
two prosecutors were convicted separately of misdemeanor obstruction of
justice and fined $500. Id.
211
See Steve Weinberg, Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a
Prosecutor is Cited for Misconduct, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 26,
2003),
http://projects.publicintegrity.org/pm/default.aspx?act=main.
Moss
responded to Weinberg in this article by stating that defendants complained
when they were unsatisfied with an outcome and he pointed out that there were
“numerous cases” that he did not pursue where the evidence did not match up.
Id.
212
See id.
213
Id.
214
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in Jail, WRAL.COM (Aug. 31, 2007), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/
1763323/.
215
See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 JUDICATURE 18, 18
(1940) (address of the former United States Attorney General) (“The prosecutor
has more control over life, liberty and reputation than any other person in
America”); see also Bennett L. Gershman, Symposium, The New Prosecutors,
53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 448 (1992) (stating that the prosecutor is “the most

430

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

proceedings, convene grand juries, grant immunity, negotiate and
permit plea bargains, pursue statutory enhancements for certain
crimes and decide whether to bring charges, what charges to bring,
and when to bring them all fall within the discretionary authority
of the prosecutor.216 While police departments have long had
internal investigation bureaus and judges could be punished for
“abuse of discretion” when determined to have acted improperly,
prosecutors have long flown under the radar of accountability.217
There is not a single prosecutor’s office that has yet to permit an
independent review board to investigate complaints of misconduct,
and while some states have passed laws that define standards for
prosecutors, they are virtually never held to those standards.218
While the American Bar Association, the Department of Justice,
and several state prosecutors offices have promulgated standards of
conduct specifically for prosecutors, there is no legal requirement
for prosecutors to follow these rules and those who break them will
only be held accountable within their offices.219 Likewise, the
federal constitution offers no guidance on the issue of prosecutors
who betray their oath to uphold justice.220 The irony here is
glaring: those who are tasked with holding the public accountable
for its actions are themselves never held accountable.
A main reason for this gap in accountability is traced back to
what proponents of prosecutorial immunity point to as a primary
and acceptable substitution for independent review: accountability
to the political electorate.221 The idea that prosecutors are
accountable to the electorate arose out of the Jacksonian populist
democracy of the 1820s.222 However, the lack of transparency in
modern prosecutors’ offices due to private charging and
negotiating practices has paired with other factors—such as media
glamorization of prosecutors’ offices—to result in an ill-informed
pervasive and dominant force in criminal justice”).
216
See Lupton, supra note 44, at 1279–83.
217
See DAVIS, supra note 45, at 15–16.
218
See id. at 16.
219
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220
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221
Id. In the United States, “more than 95 percent of the chief prosecutors
are elected.” Id. at 166.
222
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public, eroding nearly all of the public’s electoral influence as an
effective check on prosecutors who would otherwise commit
misconduct.223 In fact, some prosecutors found to have concealed
evidence or pursued erroneous charges end up moving on to higher
offices, despite their actions.224
The failure of the electoral system to act as an effective check
on otherwise unfettered prosecutorial power became a major point
of concern documented in six state-wide legal studies of the
criminal justice system in the 1920s.225 The “Wickersham Report,”
issued in 1934 by the National Commission of Law Observance
and Enforcement, further criticized the total lack of prosecutorial
accountability, stating specifically that elections failed to result in
qualified candidates securing office and did not act as a proper
check on the discretion of the prosecutor.226 “The people of the
United States have traditionally feared concentration of great
power in the hands of any one person, and it is surprising that the
power of the prosecutor has been left intact as it is today,” wrote
Earl H. DeLong and Newman F. Baker, two law scholars and
223
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Senator Roland Burris, who was chosen to take President Barack Obama’s
vacated seat in 2008, also pursued erroneous charges in the Nicarico case in his
role as then-Illinois Attorney General. Zorn, supra note 186. Peter Corning, a
prosecutor who was accused of concealing evidence in the wrongful prosecution
of an innocent man for the murder of a senior citizen, later left his job as
prosecutor and was elected a local judge. See Trial & Error: Part 1, supra note
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members of the Wickersham Commission.227 Since then, groups
seeking reform of modern prosecution have consistently pointed to
the need for an effective check on prosecutorial power in response
to revelations of the hundreds of overturned cases in recent
decades due to prosecutorial misconduct.228
D. Effective Reforms
This Note argues that the most effective reform—whereby
prosecutors could become true ministers of justice—would require
a three-tiered approach. The first of these tiers would involve
cooperative federal and state-level legislation requiring prosecutors
to establish uniform workable and enforceable standards as well as
systems to monitor prosecutors’ adherence to these standards. This
would include instituting a better record-keeping system designed
to identify, log, and pass on to defense counsel any evidence that
might tend to exculpate the accused. Prosecutors would be required
to verify that they have reviewed all evidence available, and mark
with their signatures whether evidence was turned over or denied
to defense prior to trial. Given the extreme prevalence of falsified
informant testimony in wrongful convictions,229 prosecutors would
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be required to uniformly document all deals where informants
testify against a defendant in exchange for leniency; prosecutors
would then be required to turn that information over to defense.
The second tier of reforms would require the creation of
independent review boards attached to all prosecutors’ offices that
would promptly investigate complaints filed by citizens and
defense attorneys. This system would also institute individualized
monitoring of prosecutors, including a publicly-accessible database
in which the independent body would catalog meritorious
complaints filed by defendants and the result of corresponding
investigations into misconduct. When the Los Angeles Police
Department’s Rampart Division’s widespread instances of abuse of
authority were made public in the late 1990s, the community
refused to accept a police force that saw itself as above the law.230
The city ultimately allowed for federal reform of the Los Angeles
Police, which led to a greater system of monitoring police officers,
facilitated the system for filing and investigating complaints, and
allowed the police to catalogue the complaints.231 These
recommendations presuppose that the same would need to hold
true for prosecutors. An independent review board would also have
important data at its fingertips as a result of the systems for
monitoring prosecutors previously suggested. This would enable a
Board to apply more effective and informative scrutiny when
allegations of misconduct arise. Relatively minor instances of
misconduct could be logged in a prosecutor’s file with that office
and would not ordinarily be subject to disciplinary action.
However, repeated instances of misconduct or one showing of
major misconduct (such as concealing clear exculpatory evidence
known to the prosecutor) would be met with internal disciplinary
action, which could include censure, suspension, or termination.
The final tier of these reforms would deal with those
exceptional cases in which a prosecutor acted knowingly,
maliciously, and successfully to imprison a known-innocent
defendant through abuse of his authority. The public has shown
that it will not shy away from prosecuting corrupt cops who
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knowingly commit crimes;232 as such, it is likely willing to
prosecute corrupt prosecutors as well.
The most egregious cases of prosecutorial misconduct call for
new, specific legislation that would allow for criminal prosecutions
of prosecutors, who by virtue of their authority deliberately
conceal material exculpatory evidence or put on knowingly false
material testimony to secure convictions. Some in the legal
community have criticized the notion of determining when
prosecutors presented certain evidence in bad faith and securing a
conviction against a prosecutor for failing to turn over evidence
that she may not have realized was exculpatory.233 However, the
uniform monitoring and complaint logging system proposed above
would serve as protection for the accused prosecutor by allowing
investigators to review that prosecutor’s record and determine
patterns of lawful and honest behavior that would bolster his or her
credibility.
CONCLUSION
The American prosecutor’s job is both challenging and
necessary for the continuation of a society free from those who
would cause it harm. However, there must be a check on the power
of those with the authority to take the life or liberty of any member
of our society. While a great number of prosecutors respect this
power and take on this responsibility with honor and integrity,
there are far too many others who lose track of the dire
responsibility and duty to justice that the job of a prosecutor
requires. The prosecutor struggles everyday to strike a balance
between society’s demands and those of justice. Only with
additional, structured oversight to make sure that these men and
women are living up to the oath that they swore to our society can
our criminal justice system become a more effective institution to
protect and exonerate the innocent and scrupulously punish the
guilty.
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